N

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Note added at 2003-11-13 11:06:58 (GMT)
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or, request interruptions

seemingly

Civil Code of Quebec:
2899. A judicial demand or any other act of interruption against the principal debtor or against a surety interrupts prescription with regard to both.
(ref. 1 below)




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Note added at 2003-11-14 11:11:07 (GMT) Post-grading
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post grading comment:

I think your choice is wrong.
If the \'péremption est acquise\' it means that nothing has been made during a certain period of time, that could have interrupted the running of the \'péremption\'.
Depending on local laws, peremption may be, or may not be, interrupted by determined acts of interruption (that is, specific acts and not just any \'attempt\', a too vague notion that cannot be used in this legal and formal context).
Depending on local law, a pending procedure may be also attained by peremption, should it remained interrupted (stayed) too long, that is, longer as the peremption period stated in the law.

Interruption of peremption is the interruption of a legally defined time period by certain acts (and not the interruption of a procedure); see an example at
http://www.la-fcca.org/Opinions/Pub2000/March2000/98-2364.Ma... (p. 2-3):
(in Louisiana, where statute provides that peremption period may not be interrupted, which is in general the case; interruption possibilities are rather exceptional);

\"Peremption may be raised by a party or by a court \"at any time prior to final judgment.\" LSA-C.C. art. 3460. After a peremptive period has expired, a claim or right is extinguished. See LSA-C.C. art. 3458.
Based on the provisions of LSA-R.S. 9:5605, discovery of malpractice or acquisitional knowledge of the malpractice does not apply to the three-year peremptive period. Relative to the three-year peremption period, the period commences on the
date of the malpractice. Thus, to begin the three-year peremptive period, the statute refers to only the date of the act of malpractice, not the date of discovery or the date the \"\'facts ripened into a viable cause of action sufficient to support a lawsuit[.]\'\" Reeder v. North, 97-0239, p. 7 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1291, 1296. The claimed act of malpractice was the failure to file timely in 1988. Under the statute, Ms. Magee had to file suit \"on or before September 7, 1993, without regard to the date of
discovery.\" LSA-R.S. 9:5605(B) (emphasis added). See Reeder v. North, 97-0239 at 6-9, 701 So.2d at 1295-1297. However, Ms. Magee\'s suit against Mr. Matzen was filed in 1996. Thus, Ms. Magee filed her suit after any claim or right she possessed expired
based on peremption.
We believe the result is inequitable, but statutorily ordained based on the provisions of LSA-R.S. 9:5605. We cannot alter the result without manipulating the statute. The legislature has made a policy determination that there is a three-year peremptive period which \"may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended.\" LSA-R.S. 9:5605(B). The Louisiana Supreme Court has applied the statute as written. See Reeder v. North, 97-0239 at 8, 701 So.2d at 1296, which noted the potential inequity. Unfortunately, when the Ms. Raby-Magee became aware malpractice had been committed, the three-year peremptive period had run.\"